As gene segment shuffle between viruses from the same subtype can occur frequently [7, 8] , the cocirculation in some parts of the world of the novel A(H1N1) and the human A(H1N1) Bribane-like virus might ultimately produce an oseltamivir-resistant virus by gene reassortment. However, reassortment between viruses of different lineage and/or origin might not be feasible, or eventually result in viruses of poor fitness and transmissibility [9] . Recently, this risk assessment was analysed with the avian A(H5N1) viruses. It demonstrated that, even when forced by using reverse genetics, this reassortment was not always possible [10] . 
The emergence of the novel A(H1N1) 2009 virus in Mexico triggered pandemic plans of the World Health Organization (WHO) and individual countries [1, 2] . Antiviral drugs (mainly oseltamivir) are a cornerstone for disease management until vaccines become available; however, there is concern that the new virus might become resistant to them. In 2007, an A(H1N1) virus naturally resistant to oseltamivir first emerged in Norway and then spread worldwide. This resistance was the result of an H275Y mutation in the neuraminidase (NA) gene, which has been detected in the human A/ Brisbane/59/2007 (H1N1)-like viruses (A[H1N1] Brisbane-like viruses) [3] . This naturally oseltamivir-resistant virus, which can be seen today as a wild A(H1N1) strain, was fitter than the corresponding non-resistant virus [4] . This was unexpected, as similarly resistant A(H1N1) viruses circulating prior to the emergence of the A(H1N1) Brisbane-like viruses were poorly fit [5, 6] . Recent data suggest that the NA of the novel A(H1N1) 2009 virus shares some common characteristics with the susceptible A(H1N1) Brisbane-like virus, including high substrate affinity (J-SC and BL, unpublished data)
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Introduction
On the basis of our experience, the reassortment using in vitro coinfection between A(H5N1) and human A(H3N2) or A(H1N1) viruses was almost impossible to achieve in our conditions (OF and BL, unpublished data). Here we report that gene reassortment between A(H1N1) Brisbane-like and pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 viruses is a possible event during in vitro coinfections, leading to the emergence of fit resistant viruses. Madin-Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells (CCL34; ATCC, Molsheim, France) were maintained in Ultra-MDCK medium (Lonza, Levallois-Perret, France) supplemented with penicillin/streptomycin (100 units/ ml and 100 µg/ml respectively; Lonza) and 2 mM l-glutamin (Lonza). Infection experiments were carried out in Eagle's minimum essential medium (EMEM; Lonza) supplemented with 100 units/ml penicillin, 100 µg/ml streptomycin, 2 mM l-glutamin, 1 µg/ml acetylated trypsin (Sigma-Aldrich, Saint-Quentin Fallavier, France), and defined as the infection medium (IM). Oseltamivir carboxylate (kindly provided by Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd, Basel, Switzerland) at 1 µM was added to IM (IM+O) for coinfection assays.
Methods
Viruses and cells
Oseltamivir was used for two purposes: to reduce the activity of the NA proteins expressed on the surface of infected cells and allow the superinfection by a second virus strain [11, 12] ; and to avoid overgrowth with sensitive viruses.
Coinfections assays
All experiments were carried out in duplicate. Two different procedures for infection were tested and are summarized in Figure 1 .
In procedure A (superinfection), MDCK cells were first infected with A/Lyon/969/2009 (H1N1) 2009 virus at a multiplicity of infection (MOI) of 0.5 at 34°C in IM. After 1 h, the supernatant was discarded and replaced by IM+O and cells were incubated at 34°C for an additional 3 h. The cells were then superinfected with Brisbane-like R, at an MOI of 0.5 for 1 h, washed and incubated 18 h in IM+O.
In procedure B (coinfection), MDCK cells were simultaneously infected with the two viruses at an MOI of 0.1 for 1 h at 34°C in the IM. After this infection period, the supernatant was discarded and replaced by IM+O and subsequently incubated at 34°C for 18 h.
For both procedures, after 18 h post-infection, the supernatants were harvested and 10-fold serially diluted in IM with 1 µg/ml of acetylated trypsin. Confluent MDCK cells were inoculated with these dilutions for 1 h at 34°C and then overlaid with EMEM containing 0.55% agarose, 1 µg/ml acetylated trypsin and 50 µM oseltamivir carboxylate. After 48 h at 34°C, the clones were harvested and diluted in order to infect confluent MDCK cells. The supernatant were harvested after 48 h of incubation at 34°C.
All recombinants experiments were conducted using biosafety level 4 containment procedures (Laboratory P4 Jean Mérieux, INSERM, Lyon, France).
RT-PCR for HA and NA determination and RT-qPCR targeting the M gene
Haemagglutinin (HA) and NA gene screening was carried out by using three reverse transcriptase (RT)-PCRs specifically targeting the HA of A(H1N1) 2009 virus, the HA of seasonal human A(H1N1) virus and an RT-PCR that specifically detects the H275Y mutation on the human NA segment [13] .
Viral RNA was extracted from 140 µl of MDCK cell culture supernatant with the QIAmp virus RNA mini kit (Qiagen, Courtaboeuf, France) according to the manufacturer's instructions. The RT-PCRs were all performed on ABI 7500 (Applied Biosystems, Courtaboeuf, France) platform using the SuperScript™III Platinum ® One-Step Quantitative RT-PCR System (Invitrogen, Cergy Pontoise, France). RT-PCRs were optimized with 0.8 µM each primer, 0.2 µM probe and 0.5 µl enzyme mix (primers and probes sequences are available on request). After a reverse transcription reaction at 50°C for 15 min and a denaturation step at 95°C for 2 min, a two-step amplification of 50 cycles was performed at 95°C for 15 s and 60°C for 40 s.
A calibration range of diluted transcript (kindly provided by Vincent Enouf and Sylvie van der Werf, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France) ranging from 10 5 to 10 copies per 5 µl was used for the quantitative real-time RT-PCR targeting the M gene (M RT-qPCR).
Growth kinetics of viruses
The viral growth kinetics were subsequently assessed in duplicate in vitro. MDCK cells were infected with viruses at an MOI of 0.0001. After 1 h at 34°C, the cells were washed once and then placed in a fresh IM. To determine the virus yield, we harvested fluids from cultures at different intervals post-infection, centrifuged them and determined the RNA load by M RT-qPCR.
Sequencing
For full-length sequencing, viral RNA was prepared from cell-free supernatant and sent to the PF8 sequencing platform (Institut Pasteur). The viral growth kinetics were performed on the two parental strains: A(H1N1) 2009 and an A(H1N1) Brisbane-like R containing the H275Y mutation on an A(H1N1) Brisbane-like S strain, and on both reassortant viruses detected (that is, R16 and R28 clones). Overall, the in vitro viral fitness of the reassortant viruses was similar to the two parental strains and to the Brisbane-like S virus strain. Neither the incorporation of the NA gene from the A(H1N1) Brisbane-like R, nor the Brisbanelike NP segment for the R28 clone impaired the in vitro replication capacity of the reassortant viruses.
Discussion
The first aim of our study was to test the possibility of obtaining reassortants from in vitro coinfection assays between seasonal and pandemic A(H1N1) viruses. We focused on the screening of reassortants according to their viral glycoproteins, HA and NA specifically. We first selected viruses with the pandemic HA and the NA of Brisbane-like R virus.
According to our previous failed attempts to obtain in vitro reassortants between A(H5N1) and seasonal human viruses, we designed two different protocoles for the infection experiments described in this study. Among 50 clones, two reassortants viruses -R16 and R28 -harboured the pandemic HA and the H275Y mutated NA. These two clones were obtained by superinfection (procedure A), which seems to be more efficient for producing reassortant viruses than the coinfection experiment (procedure B).
Our results confirm that genetic reassortment between human A(H1N1) viruses circulating since 2007 might result in the emergence of oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) 2009 viruses that contain the NA gene from a H275Y mutated A(H1N1) Brisbane-like virus.
We also demonstrated that those oseltamivir-resistant viruses were as fit as the wild-type parental strains in vitro. The incorporation of the A(H1N1) Brisbanelike NP segment in the R28 reassortant clone did not impair its viral fitness in vitro, contrary to what could be expected with a human NP in a genetic background from another species [10] .
As expected, no oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) 2009 virus by acquisition of the H275Y mutation was detected in our study. The chosen protocol using a high concentration of oseltamivir is not suitable for the emergence of resistant virus in vitro [11] . Nevertheless, 190 oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) 2009 viruses have been reported by the WHO [14] . In the US, the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention reported 52 cases of oseltamivir-resistant viruses. In total, 34 viruses emerged during therapy but 2 cases emerged without any indication for exposure to oseltamivir (16 cases remained under investigation) [15] . Ultimately, this event remains currently sporadic.
Our results emphasize the need for a reinforced surveillance of the emergence of such resistant strains. This surveillance should be carried out thoroughly, especially when suboptimal doses of oseltamivir are used. The A(H1N1) seasonal and pandemic viruses share some common features, such as a high affinity and activity of their NA (MO et al., unpublished data) . This characteristic might be a facilitating factor for gene exchange between the two strains, despite that it has not yet been observed in vivo. The only published study to date [16] reported that, in ferrets, A(H1N1) 2009 viruses seem to overcome A(H1N1) Brisbane-like viruses, despite some bias in the experiment (only two coinfected ferrets, both with preexisting antibodies). Moreover, this study was not designed specifically to observe the emergence of such recombinant viruses and, therefore, this event can not be ruled out. However, we are aware of the need of in vivo experiments to confirm our in vitro results, and this emphasises the need to study the viral fitness, and the transmissibility of our reassortant viruses by using animal models [17] .
Overall, we demonstrated the capacity for the novel A(H1N1) 2009 virus to acquire oseltamivir resistance by genetic exchanges with the seasonal human A(H1N1) virus. The occurrence of such an event is dependant on the cocirculation of both A(H1N1) strains, that is, resistant A(H1N1) Brisbane-like and pandemic viruses.
Hence, the susceptibility of the novel A(H1N1) 2009 to oseltamivir can be limited in time if the cocirculation of A(H1N1) seasonal and pandemic viruses is maintained, and if it results in genetic reassortment. These viruses are still detected by surveillance networks in both southern and northern hemispheres, even if seasonal A(H1N1) viruses circulate at a low level in several countries, such as China, the Russian Federation and the US [18] . Ferguson et al. [19] evaluated the probability of a reassortment event between two influenza viruses. The probability of such an event between A(H5N1) virus responsible for only a few human cases and seasonal influenza viruses responsible for annual epidemics is low, but not negligible. As for oseltamivir-resistant seasonal A(H1N1) viruses, which were detected during the 2008-2009 winter influenza epidemic, and the A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic virus, the probability must be of greater significance given the larger number of human cases.
The seasonal vaccine should have the primary aim of reducing the human coinfection probability, and therefore reducing the emergence of reassortant viruses. Moreover, this vaccine could limit the reassortant virus diffusion by immunological pressure on the A(H1N1) Brisbane-like NA. The appropriate use of antivirals is very important for the good care of patients and reduced mortality [20] . Therefore, oseltamivir should be used correctly and alternative therapeutic strategies should be proposed, including combined antiviral therapy or prioritizing the use of other antivirals to keep the oseltamivir treatment efficient until the complete disappearance of the human resistant A(H1N1) Brisbane-like virus [21] ; however, the genetic content of the reassortant strains might have some effect on the in vivo fitness of the viruses; this will be further investigated on animal models as it was for the parental A(H1N1) 2009 virus [14, 22, 23] .
